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Synopsis 
The following work devotes analysis to the consistency of the idea to measure the 
Wealth of Nations beyond GDP. Looking at the desirability, utility and feasibility of the 
concept, the main objective is to outline whether a socially and environmentally adjusted 
GDP would be able to have a real policy effect in the direction of sustainability. 
 
Section I discusses the desirability of the issue and suggests that our current 
paradigm of progress needs serious rethinking, as it rests on teleological presuppositions 
prevalent in the 17th and 18th century - an antiquated mechanical world view, developed by 
Descartes and Newton. In this context, the historical ascendency of GDP is discussed, 
outlining its rise and demise.  
 
Section II then discusses the utility of an adjusted GDP. Departing from an analysis 
of the growth elasticities of poverty (health and literacy in Annex), which gives empirical 
evidence on the insufficient correlation of GDP per capita and  living standards, conventional 
GDP will then be weight against the alternative measures.  An environmental adjustment will 
thereby be found justified on the ground of efficiency gain effects occurring along the 
allocation of resources and health expenditure among others, suggesting that the 
conventional GDP is inefficient and an economically irrational model to guide progress. 
Concerns will however be raised about the possible inflationary effect of a social adjustment, 
which is politically unfeasible under the current paradigm of progress and requires further 
research in terms of measurement techniques.  
  
Section III then suggests that the feasibility is a political question. Taking the Case 
study of the failed Green GDP attempt in China, lessons learnt will be formalised on which I 
conclude with suggestions under which circumstances an adjusted GDP would be able to 
have a real policy effect in the direction of sustainability.  
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Prologue 
Over the last 2 decades, an increasing number of  intellectuals and economists 
have argued that GDP as conventionally measured is far from a robust indicator of 
economic and social welfare and the source of large scale market and government failure, 
as it provides a ”Grossly Distorted Picture” of our economies and abstracts from major 
challenges facing us. i They argue that an adjustment for social and environmental costs is 
therefore necessary, as authorities will not recognise that they are following the wrong 
priorities at the cost of the environmental degradation and social inequalities, as long as 
GDP keeps increasing. Opponents have repudiated GDP criticisms and reject a qualitative 
improvement of the GDP due to the severe measurement problems which make such 
undertaking pointless and prone to political instrumentalisation. As there is truth in both 
arguments, the idea of a qualitatively revised GDP has continued a dire existence in 
research reports and journals for almost a generation now. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the first set of national accounts were developed by Simon Kuznets in the 
1930s, the GDP has emerged as the single most important economic indicator for 
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government policies and businessmen. As it compounds a whole sphere of economic 
activity in a single number and can be decomposed in its contributing parts, it is an 
invaluable measure of aggregate production that proofs extremely valuable for extracting 
specific information about the activities in a particular sector. By including factors like 
corporate profits, GDP also indicates potential future consumption opportunities, as 
corporate taxes, investment in research and human capital and equipment increase long-
term economic welfare.ii Further, the GDP is the broadest measure of income existing and 
has the noble features of being easily quantifiable, internationally standardised and above 
all readily available relatively consistently for all countries. As such it provides by far the best 
available base for comparative analysis, gives valid information about the position in the 
business cycle and has therefore emerged as the “godfather of economic yardsticks” for 
policy making in the 20th century. 
 
However indispensable it may be as a macroeconomic indicator for policy models 
and evaluation, it has stringent limitations which are binding when it comes to say something 
about the welfare and progress beyond well-being that can be measured in monetary terms. 
GDP statistics measure the volume and composition of final output and were never intended 
to track anything beyond. By definition, GDP excludes various crucial factors important to 
determine the level and progress towards sustainable economic well-being, so that there is 
no necessary link between the expenditure and welfare. The more these excluded factors 
diverge at a rate different from GDP growth, the more inconsistent GDP thus becomes as a 
measure of economic well-being.iii 
 
Further, GDP considers all types of expenses as unequivocally good, as long as 
they increase output. As all spending is by definition positive and no further value 
classification is attached, GDP includes many expenses that do not contribute the overall 
welfare and often rather impede it. This absence of value judgements implies that 
environmental depletion increases GDP, while cleaning it up increases it further. Neither is 
there a distinguishable difference between a hypothetical country that spends all of its 
income on military production and another country that spends everything on education. The 
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more accidents occur, the more cancer patients are diagnosed and the more frequent 
earthquakes and tornados stimulate internal demand, the better the economic welfare of a 
country in terms of GDP.  
 
In a similar vein, GDP only includes a narrow range of factors that contribute to 
economic welfare. As it only measures goods sold at market value, public goods that have 
no market value like social capital, or voluntary work and social institutions are not taken into 
account. However, these activities are still productive work. Excluding these factors, thus 
confines the credibility of GDP as a measure a nation’s total production. ivWhile valuing 
positive externalities like a low crime rate, intact environment or household work is indeed a 
delicate endeavour, these intangible factors are very significant in creating stability and an 
enabling environment needed for precipitating welfare. v 
 
Another serious issue is that GDP abstracts from inequality in income and 
consumption. While a country may be rich in GDP terms, the prosperity may be centred in 
the upper income class, making the measure unrepresentative for the lowest income 
population. GDP per capita has partly rectified this issue, does however still give a different 
picture, when controlled for the distribution of income (i.e. Gini coefficient) and the incidents 
of poverty.  
 
Clearly, relying solely on GDP as a normative indicator thus gives a distorted picture 
of economic well-being, as it cannot measure the quality of growth. Without differentiating 
between positive and negative growth externalities and specifying what is meant to grow, 
economic analysis might not reveal the sustainable path and trigger misleading policy 
conclusions. Including disasters and contra productive economic activity simply for the sake 
of demand, makes progress or retreat in development therefore indistinguishable and the 
strategy of pursuing mere GDP growth an audacious undertaking.vi  
 
Now judging a positive indicator of aggregate production, like the GDP, for failing to 
measure quality in progress is absurd. As the introductory quotation illustrates, these 
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limitations were explicitly pointed out by its developer, who after formalising the first GDP, 
spent the rest of his life cautioning people, not to over-interpret this measure of aggregate 
output. Nevertheless, real GDP per capita has come to be employed as much more than a 
positive macroeconomic indicator of production and is in fact today the standard definition of 
a person’s economic well-being, conceptually used synonymously with living standards. As 
will be shown, the association between this number and well-being is not formally based on 
economic theory. Rather under the modernist paradigm of progress, GDP has grown into 
this wider definition over time and enthusiastically become associated with a vague and 
intangible terrain of well-being, progress and development.vii If thus in critical awareness of 
its limits, the GDP has become bravely employed as the implicit target of what societies 
should strive for and increasingly denoted something that goes well beyond its deterministic 
definition, then it is this imputation and inappropriate use of GDP that legitimates judgement.   
 
While being arguably the best available approximation for living standards, it 
provides at best a very deficient and incomplete picture of the latter and it is not without 
alternatives. It so happened that a plethora of alternative indicators have been developed, 
the most famous among of which one might mention the HDI (Human Development Index), 
the GPI (Genuine Progress Indicator) and the Green GDP. After a number of conferences 
taking place on OECD and EU-level, and large research projects on the topic being carried 
out at international organisations over the last 20 years, the topic is currently being analysed 
by a working group co-chaired by no one less than the 2 laureates Joseph Stiglitz and 
Amartya Sen, who were commissioned by Nicholas Sarkozy to develop a “measurement of 
economic performance and social progress” that is more responsive to environmental 
externalities and living standards than the conventional yardstick.viii 
 
This high profile selection of researchers denotes the importance the issue has 
gained over the last years and underlines the serious concerns that persist about the 
adequacy of GDP used as a measure of living standard and progress. In an era where 
seemingly “soft issues” like the environment, food prices, public health, population growth 
and poverty ceded to be side-issues, arising as key determinants in geopolitics and even 
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threats to global well-being, the issue about how we account for what we value seems to be 
taking center stage. As these challenges are cross-disciplinary, do not shy away from the 
artificial divides of national sovereignty and the narrow pursuits of relative economic gain, 
this seems to reflect more than a trend and rather a growing need to develop functioning 
incentives for a priority change in the actions of governments and individuals.ix 
Internationally binding conventions such as the Kyoto protocol are one well intentioned 
option to overcome the tragedy of commons. However, legal agreements have limitations as 
they can by definition never cover all cases; are based on outside enforcement, rather than 
intrinsic motivation; and carry above all high monitoring costs without guarantee of 
compliance. xAs Paul Hawken remarks, “no plan to reverse environmental and social 
degradation can be enforced if it requires a wholesale change in the dynamics of the 
market”. 
 
Some people, including myself, would therefore argue that changing the incentive 
structures of the system, would lie more closely to the root and solution of the problem. The 
key is to civilise capitalism, which requires correcting the defect in its accounting system. If 
the right ecological and social incentive structures are set, markets will work for the 
environment, thereby responding to the genuine interests of current and future generations.  
I depart from this raison d’être, acknowledging that given the need for long-term 
thinking and the relevancy to future generations, the topic genuinely deserves to be treated 
in form of a political economy dissertation. As it not only raises issues in political philosophy, 
but has real world policy implications that could concern pretty much the future of the planet, 
it is worth scrutinising the value behind the idea of an adjusted GDP to shed light on its 
consistency limitations and political consequences. With this in mind, this dissertation aims 
critically evaluate the value of this idea by analysing its desirability, utility and 
applicability/feasibility in order to see, whether a socially and environmentally adjusted GDP 
would be able to have a real policy effect in the direction of sustainability? 
 
Section I discusses the desirability and approaches the question from a 
moral/philosophical point of view. I will describe how GDP has come to indicate what 
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societies should strive for and how, given the signs of climate change and increasing global 
inequalities, societies seem to have lost track of what we are chasing there? With reference 
to the different worldviews prevalent in different centuries, I will embark on a discussion of 
paradigms of progress, which emerged out of the particular historical context of a time, 
finding that our current paradigm in progress still shares many features with an outdated 
mechanistic worldview developed by Newton and Descartes in the 17th/18th century. 
Drawing then on the historical rational of the GDP, its rise and demise in this framework will 
be outlined concluding on the need to redefine the narrow understanding of economic 
welfare going beyond GDP, giving way to rethink questions about what the wealth of nations 
should be and what progress we want?  
 
Based on this analysis, Section II then accounts for the utility of a qualitative GDP. 
Looking for some evidence about the relevancy of GDP as a measure of welfare, an 
empirical analysis will first test the general assumption that GDP is associated with living 
standards, finding a weak correlation between the 2. The potential of broader definitions of 
progress indicators shall than be discussed with reference to mainly an adjustment for 
environmental (Green GDP) and for social costs. Given some general criticisms of all 
proposed adjustments, an environmental adjustment of GDP will be found an efficient 
ecological. Drawing on a Mc Kinsey study commissioned by the US government, evidence 
will be suggested that the longer we postpone environmental cost internalisation, the more 
costly this will be in terms of foregone growth due to inefficiently allocating resources. While 
this suggest that market economy and sustainable development are not mutually exclusive, 
the case of social cost internalisation will be found more difficult. Acknowledging the good 
intentions behind a socially adjusted GDP coherent with a very broad definition of progress, 
it will be out lined that the efficiency gain effect occurring with an environmentally adjusted 
GDP cannot be expected to occur when taking into account social costs. Rather, it will be 
found that additional social costs on aggregate levels will have to be transferred to the 
consumer, thereby making the desirable outcome politically very unpopular. 
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Section III then, argues that the feasibility of an adjusted GDP is a political question. 
Drawing on the case studies of China, where the attempt to implement a Green GDP has 
failed just a few years ago, lessons learnt will be analysed so as to draw possible 
generalisations to conclude and shows the conditions under which an adjusted GDP would 
be able to have a real policy affect in direction of sustainability and to what extend a  
 
The main conclusions of the dissertation are that it is not rational to dismiss GDP as 
an indicator of welfare per se, but that it proves vital to adjust for environmental and some 
social costs, which not only reflect the social-economic situation more in the interest of 
society, but are equally balanced  with utility so that the argument for an environmentally 
adjusted GDP can be made in terms of pure rational cost reasoning, while further 
adjustment for broader social cost inclusion would require a currently quite unrealistic 
change of mind set, as arguments cannot be made on cost grounds, which rather work 
against it and therefore requires further research.  
 
The limitations of this dissertation are binding in terms of data availability, technical 
depth on indicators and amount of indicators reviewed. Largely reliant on UN data, the 
empirical part also had to make various simplifications in order to allow analysis. While the 
general findings of this analysis are compatible to previous findings, problems with non-
stationarity in the data require a careful interpretation of results. Further, a discussion of 
measurement techniques went beyond the scope of this politics dissertation sothat the 
discussion was kept at a conceptual level.  
 
1. GDP – Definition and policy relevance  
1.1. Definition 
 
The Gross Domestic product measures the size of an economy as captured by the 
market value of all goods and services sold within a given time period.   
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Based on the National Accounts, the GDP is a flow-measure of production, thus 
flows through the economy but non-productive financial transaction to avoid double-counting. 
Second-hand production like the purchase of stocks and bonds are therefore excluded, as 
they merely change ownership without additional creation of productive capital.  
 
For policymakers, GDP is the preferred measure, as they are mostly concerned with 
the domestic economy. Over the years, a number of altered versions have been introduced 
with a slightly different focus, like the GNI and a nominal and real version have been 
developed to reflect different aspects such as geographic boundaries.  
 
Moreover, the system of national accounts (SNA) on which the GDP indicator is 
based also provides information on the price level of output, and allows distinguish between 
nominal and real GDP. Nominal GDP denotes the total amount of money spent on output, 
while real GDP is adjusted for inflation. As it show the real value of goods and services, real 
GDP per capita has come to be used as an indicator of welfare and living-standard and its 
regional convergence has become a common indicator of development, narrow and 
simplistic in normative terms however as will be discussed later. 
1.2. Policy Relevance – Political Economy of the GDP 
 
As the most rigorous and most widely accepted economic indicator, the GDP it 
feeds into policy making in manifold ways. Not only does it epitomise the economic welfare 
of a country, given the thorough report on international, regional and industry accounts, it 
also provides the basis for a comprehensive examination of the impact of external and 
internal factors on the economy, as well as its components of final expenditure and income 
by industry sector and region.  
 
As an easy-to-use barometer of business climate and for these reasons, its policy 
importance is substantial. On EU-level for example it plays a crucial role in shaping 
economic integration process by providing policy targets and eligibility criteria. Under the 
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Stability and Growth Pact for example, member states commit themselves that national debt 
should not exceed 60% of GDP and that the annual budget deficit should be below 3% of 
GDP.xi Further, the target for overseas development aid of a member state is set at 0.7% of 
GDP and the resources of the Structural and Cohesion fund are allocated according to GDP 
per capita criteria.xii In other policy fields it is even used as a direct measure of policy 
success. The most apparent example for this is monetary policy, where inflation is targeted 
according to whether or not it increases GDP as the key parameter. Given its crucial role in 
decision making as direct reference for policy analysis and essential economic yardstick to 
set policy criteria, targets and success indicators, it is unsurprising that GDP has been 
labelled “the godfather of the indicator world”. xiii 
 
Unsurprisingly, the GDP is therefore often used as a political tool, which has proven 
extremely effective in referring to growth and living standards at the same time. Politician 
often stress that they have increased growth by…, suggesting how much they have made 
the country better off on their own and indeed, elections are won and lost on growth rates 
among others.xiv This rather bold simplification has become the effective basis of a paradigm 
of progress which is very successful in perpetuating itself indefinitely. Adjusting the GDP, 
proponents argue, would uproot these polemics of growth and stop the abstraction from the 
biophysical and social reality we live in.    
 
1.3. Changing World views and their Paradigms in Progress  
 
The GDP has been the unrivalled yardstick for economic policy for such a long time 
that it might seem to most people as a totemic artefact. From an historic point of view 
however, the GDP stands at the recent end of the time spectrum, along which economic 
measurement standards grew out of their particular historical context and state of mind of an 
era. As civilisations developed from savage forms to peasants, manufacturers and service 
providers, so did their worldviews and the engendered mode of thought and values they 
accounted for. As Daly points out, it is only in the 20th century that this development seems 
to have come to a halt - stable or discontinued as one might phrase it. xvA historical review 
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of the relation between the state of mind of a civilisation and their understanding of progress 
is therefore fertile as it allows insights into the understanding of value, welfare and progress 
over time, which lies at the heart of proposals of an adjusted GDP. Not only does it facilitate 
an understanding and unbiased account of the current system and how it came about, it is 
also crucial to project potential future developments, which is what the central idea of this 
dissertation is mainly concerned with.  
 
What we account for depends on what we value. This has always been the case 
and, as we will see, is very closely connected to a particular understanding of progress in 
history. In the understanding of Greek philosophers for example, the world was the creation 
of an encompassing deity and was by definition perfect. In this theocentric understanding of 
the world, Plato and Aristoteles created a philosophy that perceived change in the 
established order as mere signs of decay. The world, they said, is subject to history as a 
cyclical decaying process, gradually moving from order to disorder, not progressing towards 
perfection over time.xvi “Change meant corruption and disaster”, it was undesirable and 
suspicious and in an ideal order of society, it should therefore be avoided so as to slowdown 
the inevitable proceed of decay.xvii One finds thus that the notion of growth and change were 
rather meaningless and had no association with value or progress. Progress was perceived 
as a horizontal process, where spiritual and intellectual satisfaction could be gained from the 
accumulation of knowledge. The ethos of the Ancient Greek world view hence implied that 
the salvation lay in preserving what was, for current and future generations – which sound 
like a hidden insinuation of modern environmental thought, sustainable development and 
steady state economics, which we shall come back to in due course. xviii 
 
The world view shaped by theologians of the Roman Church in Medieval times was 
also “incompatible to the idea of progress.xix Guided by the biblical concepts of “creation”, 
“redemption” and “last judgement”xx, the Christian world view also suggested a picture of 
history that tended towards decay, without progressive features attached to it. History was 
also without direction, neither progressing towards perfection, nor backwards moving. God 
made history and mystical religious philosophies gave order to the structure of the Christian 
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paradigm which described a life fully guided by a moral code that left no room for human 
action to shape history as more than a mere participator, merely guided by duties and 
commitments, rather than desires and freedoms. Seeking salvation from the struggle of life 
between good and evil was crucial and rendered the idea of man as dominant of nature and 
history irrelevant. Again, the believe in progress or desire to measure it played no major role. 
xxi  
 
In the early 16th century however, the philosopher Francis Bacon challenged the 
theological authorities, by departing from the Greek traditional questions of Why to a 
scientific pragmatist research approach asking  How exactly conditions could be controlled. 
Putting forth the idea that knowledge is power and that science can discover general laws 
without divine revelations and magic, his ideas were perceived as perverse blasphemy, but 
in due course this notion of history as a natural development should give rise to a 
progressive world view emerging in the late Renaissance where humans could manipulate 
their destiny on earth and direct it. Conjoint with the legacy of other enlightened thinkers like 
Abbe de Saint-Pierre, Voltaire, Turgot, Bodin and Montesquieu, Bacon eased the deification 
of human reason and a consequent admiration of objective knowledge and scientific proofs 
were signs of the belief of a new indefinite social progress gaining ground.  
 
In the early 17th century then, the Cartesian world view became the scientific 
fundament of a philosophy where humans had finally become "masters and possessors of 
nature".xxii Describing the underlying laws of a static mechanical world, Descartes had found 
“the source of all things” in mathematics and put forth an anthropocentric world view, where 
humans familiar with the laws of motion, were able to manipulate the latter towards their 
own divine ends.xxiii Human reason then had finally gained supremacy over divine 
providence so that god was not needed anymore or at least lost his status as the ultimate 
reason for the unexplainable.xxiv In the believe that the social world would follow natural  
laws, the Cartesian world view then also tidied up the previous paradigms of decay, chaos 
and confusion. As this view seemed to make everything explainable , thus controllable, the 
Cartesian spirit was irresistible, promising that a credible pursuit of perfection on earth was 
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controllable, providing mankind with the faith in progress which would make them the 
masters of the universe.  
 
Newton then endowed people with the mathematical devices they needed to pursue 
such endeavour. xxv In his Magnus Opus Principia Mathematica (1686), he formalised the 
laws of motion of earthly bodies in the mechanical system. Overwhelmed by the pragmatism, 
straightforwardness and predictability of these laws, the book impressed intellectuals across 
disciplines, so that intentionally or not, he had also created the measurement fundament of 
the mechanical world view.xxvi Unsurprisingly, Principia Mathematica also became the 
foundation of economics as we know it today. In fact, pretty much everything formalised in 
the emerging economic sciences used Newton’s mathematics. It brought with it an atomistic 
view of individuals who interacted mechanically in society - a clock-world view that is highly 
visible in later social science work. The analytically rigorous approach in Adam Smith’s 
social model for example, owes much to Newton's “conception of nature as a law-bound 
system of matter in motion“. xxvii Just like nature, the social world in the Wealth of Nations 
obeys physical laws of motion. The obvious disorder in society, the logic goes, could 
therefore only be due to the fact that humans infringed on natural laws. Society thus needed 
to be rearranged so as to follow the natural order in the mechanical system in which 
maximising individuals, guided by self interest and the laws of demand and supply, would 
generate growth and create the Wealth of Nations. 
 
For a moral philosopher like Smith, this was a very narrow approach, but it shows 
clearly the undoubted faith in the existence of a logical order in society and the rigidity of 
thinking at the time about public goods like protection, defence, culture or environmental 
infrastructure. The latter was considered a mere unordered system of matter of utility, a 
snapshot of which can be found in John Locke’s Second Treatise on government. People 
“must become effectively emancipated from the bonds of nature” he urges, because “land 
that is left to nature…is called waste”, - a rather blunt expression of contempt about the 
biosphere, which indicates ones more, how the essence of Newton’s anthropocentric 
conception of the world had become internalised by contemporary thinkers. xxviiixxix  
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The fascination about precision and mathematics which emerged with the 
mechanical world view implicitly reduced the world to quantity looking at quality as a 
secondary matter. With measurable quantities, it seemed, the chaos and decay observed by 
earlier world views could be overcome. All that was needed was an understanding of the 
laws of nature and a reliable measure of it. These then seemed to be the ingredients to 
solve and control problems in physics while being equally applicable to the social sciences. 
Quantification promised to make events predictable in the machine age and with it progress 
started to encompassed vertical traits, which gave rise to a paradigm of progress that saw 
material abundance as the sole purpose of attainment of terrestrial happiness. In fact in the 
Wealth of Nations, Smith doesn’t even define wealth before he goes on to describe the 
system in which national income can prosper. xxxAmassing of material well-being, the logic 
went, would increase the order of society, and provided them with the stability needed for 
the pursuit of wealth and social well-being. As long as an honourable service like nature did 
not provide a tangible value that showed up in increased output, this could play no genuine 
role for a nation's well being. In their inherent features of intangibility and inconsistency, 
qualitative features of life and ideals of social well-being were unmathematical and had 
therefore fallen into disguise.  
 
Despite the near hegemony of ad infinitum growth, there were also notable 
exceptions like John Stuart Mill. As one of the first political economists that plead for the 
conservation of the biosphere, he neither saw material abundance as an end in itself, nor 
believed that growth could be perpetuated endlessly. xxxi He departs from what he calls the 
“old school” of political economists and looks beyond the “kind of economical progress 
which excites the congratulations of ordinary politicians; the mere increase of production 
and accumulation.” “Towards what ultimate point is society tending by its industrial 
progress?, he asks;  When the progress ceases, in what condition are we to expect that it 
will leave mankind?”xxxii While being perfectly compatible with Newton’s mechanical world 
view, Mill cautioned that the “conversion of all natural capital into man-made capital” was not 
progressive thereby putting the notion of boundless progress back into its physical limits. As 
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he could not observe endless growth in nature, he did not search for it in the social and 
economic world either. Rather, he pleads to aim for the stationary state, where capital and 
population is constant, while human improvement would continue to progress. “There would 
be as much scope as ever for all kinds of mental culture, and moral and social progress; as 
much room for improving the Art of Living and much more”.xxxiii With this Mill had 
conceptualised the social world back on the ontological grounds within the physical world. 
While having been equally interested in the allocation and distribution issue in economics, 
he added the issue of scale, i.e the possible biophysical limits, which implied that relative 
growth, i.e. at replacement rate was the goal and not the end in itself. xxxiv 
 
Advanced these thoughts might have been, the circumstances of the era did show 
no need to think beyond the mechanical paradigm, which most successfully satisfied what 
some people have labelled “industrial metabolism” at the time. xxxvThough Pigou had 
formalised the concept of externalities in the beginning of the 19th century, growth continued 
to be seen as the ultimate panacea and means to the end of higher living standards, with 
which it had found a rather awkward though fruitful association, that I think lies at the heart 
of many problems with which we are faced today. Mill’s balanced progress paradigm 
through steady state economics should only become important again in the 21st century, 
when resource constraints threatened military supply and the separate development of 
social sciences, ecology and economics had to be reconsidered. With these preliminary 
observations on different world views and their paradigms in progress, I proceed to a more 
detailed examination of the rise of the GDP as the “godfather of indicators” to its demise as 
a simplistic normative measure of living standard.  
 
1.4. GDP - Its Rise and Demise 
As the theory of progress gained ground with the mechanical world view, the need 
for accurate measures arose and with it the question what should be measured in the first 
place, which gave rise to the emergence of different meanings attached to the concept of 
production. Unsurprisingly therefore, that the first estimates of national production date back 
to this time. Thomas Petty’s approach from 1665 for example accounted for taxable capacity. 
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In France, at the same time, the physiocrats developed a measure with emphasis on 
agriculture, which they considered the most essential source of social welfare. Adam Smith 
for example then in his “national produce”, also included manufacturingxxxvixxxvii, refused 
however to take into account “unproductive labour” with which he referred to the tertiary 
sector such as army, lawyers, churchman, musician. xxxviii These “menial servants”,” how 
honourable, how useful, or how necessary soever”, they were, did not produce anything “for 
which an equal quantity of service” could “afterwards be procured”. xxxix 
Given these early forms, the Great depression was the initial event that created the 
urge to develop a reliable and comprehensive fundament of data on the basis of which an 
indicator of national income could be built. xl Prior to that, policy makers had no trustworthy 
basis for analysis so that policy design was impeded by unreliable information like stock 
price indices freight car loadings, and fragmented indices of industrial output. xli As this 
makeshift system which lacked consistency in measurement and coverage was severely put 
under stress by the Great depression, so called “experts” found themselves unable to advise 
the government on basic questions about the state of the economy. As the data they relied 
on was already two years old and of fragmented nature, the unsustainability of the situation 
became apparent and an obvious threat. The Department of Commerce drew conclusions 
and commissioned laureate Simon Kuznets to develop a comprehensive measure of 
aggregate economic output who then subsequently designed the prototype system of 
national accounts (SNA) which was the cornerstone of the GDP as we know it today.  
 
As the first integrated set of accounts, it allowed countrywide policy evaluation and 
created the framework of reference for analysis of components of final output, income and 
demand of the entire economy. In his research report from 1937, he points out that the SNA 
are useful to evaluate the contribution of the economic system to the needs of consumption 
and of capital accumulation and constitute a comprehensive total for studying changes over 
time in the productivity of the economic system and in the differences in the apportionment 
of the total product among various significant groups. However, Simon Kuznets also 
stressed that GDP “is an approximation to the value of the total stock of commodities and 
services produced” and that its “narrow” definition “should be kept in mind in any attempt to 
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interpret it”.xlii  Infact, Kuznets was well aware of the underlying “scheme of values or social 
philosophy” of his measure and when discussing which criteria of should be chosen to 
define production.  
 
While he clearly favoured a measure of ”social productivity” and was well aware of 
the political importance and consequences of the “mechanical total”, he also considered a 
broader measure beyond the measurable scope and chose to stick to the narrow definition 
as a good blueprint of a national, the limitations of which just had to be pointed out clearly to 
avoid misinterpretations:  
 
Despite his efforts to outline the limitations, the 1930s provided an enabling 
environment in which the GDP was embraced as a tool to gain control over the situation and 
steer production in the “soon-to be wartime economies”. xliii In an era of severe financial 
distress, naturally calling for greater public intervention and under the seminal influence of 
Keynes’ General Theory, calling for government intervention, the GDP filled the gap of the 
needed easy-to-use measure to manage and coordinate economies during World War II. xliv 
As laureate Robert Solow putted it, the GDP became the “anatomy” of Keynesian 
“physiology” and was the central guide for reconstruction and the post-war Keynesian hey-
days, where it genuinely proved its value by “providing an integrated “birdseye view of the 
economy”. xlv  
 
In the post-war period, growth theory had become the priority in economics so that 
in the 1950’s, the statistical tool was strengthened by the formal definition of theoretical 
growth models. In essence, the growth models were just the formalised logic put forth by 
classical economists: As population increases, demand increases, employment increases, 
Output increases. Wages for manufacturing allow for larger families, which creates more 
demand, more employment, more production - a self-propagating cycle that implies that 
“more is better” -  as the average amount of goods increases, people can chose what to 
consume, so they must be better off - thus the origin of which the pseudo relationship 
between growth and development. So far so good, no mention about multiple or bad 
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equilibria and with the GDP, one could measure where one stood on the way to progress 
and a better life.  
 
By 1962, Kuznets observed the reigning “expansionism” to which he was thought to 
have contributed the holy grail of measurement. After its development, Kuznets spend the 
rest of his life cautioning the overenthusiastic interpretation of the GDP which he saw 
increasingly being used to “tell the public how much better or worse off it” was. xlvi 
“Distinctions between quantity and quality of growth”, he warned, “must be kept in mind, 
between its costs and return, and between the short and the long run”. “Goals for more 
growth should specify more growth of what and for what.”xlvii However, as business cycles 
became less extreme and more manageable since its introduction, this common sense was 
suppressed. Based on the Kuznets curve observation that inequality increases in the early 
stages of economic growth in order than to bottom out as societies get richer (a concept 
which was later reconstructed for environmental costs), conclusions were drawn that GDP 
growth was the remedy to decrease inequality, as growth trickles down while equally 
contributing to a cleaner environment in the long run, as people would start demanding more 
recreational space as they grow richer.  
 
While the fallacy of the human/nature divide became visible in the 1950’s, as 
resource constraints started to create supply bottlenecks to military supply in the Korean 
War, the pundits of “growthmania” had already found an answer. Possibly resources maybe 
exhaustible, but luckily their substitutes were not, suggesting that an additional unit of 
technology will do it. Nevertheless, technology wasn’t the remedy, mankind proved less 
inventive than expected and failed to find a decent substitute for fresh air or drinking water, 
which challenged the believe that technology can solve the problems of a crowded planet 
and the increasing challenge of negative externalities. xlviii 
 
A few centuries before, classical political economists had been putting living 
standards at the ends for which they thought to have the means. Now, qualitative questions 
again would have necessitated a rethinking of the whole system which seemed to work quite 
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well anyway. Further, the SNA, on which the GDP was based, proved its capacity to 
respond to policy needs of a particular time and were flexibly expanded over the time, both 
of which contributed that the success story of the GDP was not discontinued and undertook 
constant revision and expansion such as the response to inflationary pressure in the 1960’s 
and 70’s, where measures of output were adjusted to reflect real expenditure patterns or a 
“quality adjusted price and output measures for computers”. xlix more recently to name just a 
few. These continued revision, underlines the responsivenenss of the GDP and proves its 
ability to adapt to policy challenges of its time, so that I - who started up as a deep critic of 
the GDP and with an rather partisan attitude towards it - had to admit how essential the 
steady stream of consistent GDP data is and that from an overall perspective, it does not 
seem exaggerated in any sense to call the GDP one of the greatest inventions of the 20th 
century.  
 
However, the limits to growth began to arise at the horizon and concerns arose 
about how much this number can tell about the complex world we live in? When nature 
started to cease reliant supply human needs as an object of consumption and means of 
production during the Korean War in the 1950s, president Truman commissioned a first 
study on exhaustible resources, in which he also instructed to give a broader and long-run 
picture of the issue. l Published in 1952, the Commission Report found that consumption 
was rising faster than resources which therefore constituted a long-term problem.  
 
However until the 1970s, the macroeconomic approximation given by the GDP and 
the underlying modernist anthropocentric paradigm of progress was able to successfully 
abstract from social and environmental externalities. But this climate changed. In 1968, 
Hardin illustrated the Tragedy of Commons, showing that free access to unlimited demand 
for exhaustible resources creates incentives for over-exploitation, with which he joined the 
group of disillusioned growth sceptics like Kapp, who speaks for a multitude when he 
observes that “capitalism must be regarded as an economy of unpaid costs, ‘unpaid’ is so 
far as a substantial proportion of the actual costs of production remain unaccounted for in 
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entrepreneurial outlays; instead they are shifted to, and ultimately borne by, third persons or 
by the community as a whole”.li  
 
In the period that followed more and more people became disenchanted with the 
paradigms of Growth, underlying the GDP, which they accused to create unsustainable 
national priorities in terms of income distribution and the biosphere. A legacy of critical study 
started with the ’ Limits to Growth Report to the Club of Rome showed that if we stay on the 
business as usual mode, “the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within 
the next one hundred years”.lii More recent initiative include “Redefining Progress” (1995),  
aimed to redefine progress, calculating the GPI, a more comprehensive measure, finding  
that output and welfare measures began to diverged in the 1970s, and that therefore GDP 
can no longer be used to measures total economic and social well-being.liii 
 
From Grassroots movement to international agencies, people raised serious 
concern, over what is appropriately expressed by Paul Ehrlich, calling for “a life style which 
has its goal in maximum freedom and happiness, not a maximum Gross National Product” liv 
As a consequence, NGOs, researchers, statistical agencies and all major international 
organisations have worked on the issue and produced a flood of alternative satellite 
indicators of all sorts, trying to develop a holistic measurement that would more 
appropriately reflect the world we live in and challenges we face.  
 
More recently, publications like the Stern Report on Climate change have had 
disillusioning effect onto our stubborn denial of the ontological reality of our planet, on which 
we continued to produce in a rather blind pursuit of an outdated paradigm of progress for so 
long. While still not being good enough of a proof for some people, the 2008 crisis with 
manifold faces in terms of food prices, migration crisis, worsening extreme weather 
phenomena, oil price hikes and above all a global financial crisis is hopefully a clear signal 
that the externalisation of real costs has resulted in a skewed economic policy. Today, it is 
not anymore about just using energy saving light bulbs and buying in charity shops, but that 
we may be the last generation to prevent the worst before climate change becomes 
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irreversible. Internalising theses costs would show different picture of the economy and the 
progress we’re chasing there. As common sense may eventually suggest, our arbitrary 
circle of values which we draw with the conventional GDP might have brought us into a 
delicate situation where we are maximising something subject to expenses we might not be 
aware of as we do not account for them, but which we most certainly, cannot bear.  
 
Today it remains to be acknowledged that GDP cannot measure welfare, and its 
use as a normative measure is about as contra productive and unsatisfying as using a fork 
for cutting. It was a functional measure to track military production for wartimes, helped 
reconstruction afterwards and is now merely a good measure for an inherited economic 
model from an outmoded anthropocentric worldview with growth as the Holy Grail, which 
now misdirects policy due to a defect in the pricing system which sacrifices future against 
current well-being.lv GDP growth is not the panacea, and keeps on sending wrong signals to 
the public, where “by the curious standard of the GDP, the nation’s economic hero is a 
terminal cancer patient who is going through a costly divorce.”lvi Our definition of Economic 
and social well being has little to do with genuine progress and is particularly unsuited for 
resolving social and environmental problems. Rather as an internationally recognised 
standard, GDP became associated with living standard, because it provided the politicised 
statistical proof for the successful implementation of adequate policies of governments - a 
positive growth rate suggests we’re better off, which is useful during elections. lvii The very 
fact that this debatable link between GDP and living standards evolved over time, was 
however the first sign of its demise. The very fact that it was asked to measure something it 
did not measure shows the genuine demand for expanding it into a measure of development 
and well-being. So far it only proved responsive to the need of the most lucrative industries, 
in terms of an expansion of the accounts beyond the incorporation of high tech and banking 
estimates, has however not responded as effectively to the social and environmental 
challenges we face, in terms of a reconsideration of wealth and progress. A general 
tendency to include new sustainable indicators into policy making worldwide is a sign that 
GDP alone is not sufficient anymore to satisfy the public, who is increasingly demanding an 
indicator that goes beyond GDP. The findings of the Stiglitz-Sen initiative working on the 
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development of a template measure of Economic Performance and Social Progress is 
therefore awaited with great expectations by many people, including myself. This section 
asked for a rethinking of our concept of production in terms of its real costs and concludes 
that an adjusted GDP is  undoubtedly desirable if not necessary…or would you like your 
grandchildren talking about you in a similar fashion the after-war generation did about their 
racist parents:  
 
2. Utility 
 
Having discussed the desirability of an expanded GDP, it was concluded that cost 
internalisation is desirable, as it would provide a corrective lens for economic policy. While 
this might be intuitive, there is a legitimate question, to what extend alternative indicators 
would be able to provide a more holistic picture of well-being and how critical the 
measurement problems emphasised by its critics do impede the underlying good intentions 
by causing unexpected and unintended consequences in terms of its effect on prices and 
possible tendency to political instrumentalisation. In this section the focus shall therefore 
shift to the issue of utility, examining how much living standards improve for a given 
increase in GNI per capita, as a prior step to then scrutinising what utility one might expect 
from integrating social and environmental costs into GDP the consistency of 2 alternative 
measurement approaches against their accusations, whose major merits and limitations 
shall be outlined as well. proposals that take into account intangibles that may affect the 
economic and social welfare of a country.   
 
2.1. The Growth-living standard link: How much do we benefit, if GDP goes up? 
 
The fact that GDP per capita is the omnipresent measure used to compare 
consumptive potential between countries is attributable to the lack of consistent 
measurement of other composite measures of socio-economic well-being. As a 
consequence, GDP has implicitly become subverted for the purpose of referring to living 
standards directly. As mentioned, the origin of this normative flavour of GDP dates going 
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back to the 1950s early growth theories, following the basic logic that as output increases, 
employment and consumption opportunities increase, so people must be better off. But does 
a greater range of consumable goods readily imply higher living standards? As pointed out 
earlier, the numerous abstractions of the GDP when used as to assess qualitative concerns, 
suggest that this conclusion is far-fetched. The US for example outperforms Canada widely 
in GDP per capita terms. Nevertheless Canadians live longer, have a lower infant mortality 
and higher school enrolment rates. lviiiSo clearly, the capacity to improve living standards 
given by a high GDP, gives at best a partial and distorted picture of the economic and social 
conditions of a country and can therefore not be expected to reflect changes in living 
standards. Or can it?  
 
While most of the literature confirms the existence of a positive link between growth 
and societal well-being lix and living standards of rich countries generally seem to show 
evidence for this, there is less agreement on how much exactly we benefit, as GDP per 
capita increases. There might be a link, but how strong is this link? This question is 
important, as it concerns the concrete utility of GDP as a normative indicator. In the 
following empirical investigation, I shall therefore devote analysis to how much living 
standards improved for a given increase in GNI per capita. Based on a panel dataset, in 
which I included 158 countries and 13 regions observed over a period of 15 years, the 
analysis was carried out using STATA to test how effectively growth has translated into 
improved living standards. As living standards have a known relationship to poverty 
reduction, health and education standards, we can estimate their growth elasticities to 
quantify the relevancy of the GDP-Well-being relationship.    
 
Definition and Concepts 
 
The growth elasticity of a dependent variable is calculated by the percent change in 
the dependent variable (poverty, literacy, health) with respect to a one percent increase in 
GNI per capita, which was selected for availability reasons and serves as a proxy for income 
or expenditure per capita.  
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The general definition of growth elasticity is given by:  
              , 
 
where Pov refers to the poverty measure and Y/Pop to per capita GNI. If interested 
in the growth elasticity of poverty this would than be interpreted as the poverty reducing 
impact of growth in terms of income - the greater the elasticity of growth (>1), the more pro-
poor is economic growth. 
 
The Model  
 
 
Following the methodological approach by Ravillion in a World Bank study, I 
estimated growth elasticity of povertylx lxi, where logarithms are taken, so as to get output in 
G). The 
model was than expanded by estimating two further growth elasticities of living standard 
proxy that were health and education. Further, the amount of control variables was 
increased to compare the relative significance and impact of growth taken alone.   
 
Growth elasticity of poverty (Table 1) – Main Findings 
 
When estimating the extent to which GNI per capita decreases poverty, it was found 
that the growth elasticity of poverty varied between  -0.81 and -1.32, that is, a 10% increase 
in GNI per capita reduces poverty (% of population living under 1$ (PPP) per day) between 
8.1-13.2%. This large range suggests that effect of poverty reduction through a rise in GNI 
per capita depends on what other variables we control for, i.e. how holistic we define welfare. 
Taken alone a 10% increase in income, poverty is reduced by 9.8% (Model 1), which is 
significant and able to explain 59% of the overall variance in the model (R2 = 0.5987). 
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Controlling for income inequality (Model 2), the poverty reduction effect decreases slightly to 
9.4%, while income inequality enters the equation significantly increasing the population 
below 1$(PPP) per day by 6.3% with a similar model fit (R2 =58.4%).   
 
Further it was found that poverty becomes more elastic to growth, i.e. decreases 
more, when we include further control variables. In Model 3-6 poverty became therefore 
more responsive to an increase in GNI per capita, which now reduced poverty between 10-
13%, income inequality increases it around 6% (Model 3-6 have biased estimators, due to 
the strong correlation between Gini and population with lowest income share), leaving a net 
growth elasticity of poverty of about 4 to 10%, depending on the extent of inequality. An 
increase in Life expectancy however, reduces poverty between 7.7-12.8% and an increase 
in the poorest 20% also proofs to reduce poverty significantly by about 11%, which suggests 
that GNI in the prevalence of income inequality is likely to be a very ineffective poverty 
reducer. 
 
Compared to earlier studies of this kind (Adams, 2004; Ravillion,2003; Bourguignon, 
2003), which usually found growth elasticity of poverty between -2.0 to -3.0%, (that is a 
poverty reduction of about 20-30%, given a 10% increase in GDP), the found poverty 
reduction between 10-13% is very low.lxii A reason for that may be the difference in variables 
used. I used GNI per capita, which was the variable I could best work with. Previous studies 
used GDP per capita or other income measures. Also elasticities have the property to 
increase when observed over longer time series, so the lower elasticity found may be due to 
the relatively small interval observed, while previous studies looked a longer time series. 
These studies also did not net the poverty reduction by GDP with the poverty increase of the 
Gini 1 and did not control for other variables, which was included here to reflect the possible 
worst case scenario and to see the relative efficiency of growth to reduce poverty compared 
to other variables.  
 
                                                 
1 See Son. H (2007) for interesting study on  how much growth in mean income or expenditure will be 
required 
to offset a 1 percent increase in inequality, with poverty remaining unchanged. 
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Conclusions: 
We thus find that growth reduces poverty by about as much as it increases. If 
corrected for income inequality, which increases poverty, as it rises, the Net poverty 
reduction performed by inequality-corrected growth is between 4-10%, thereby being partly 
outperformed by other variables, such as an increase in life expectancy or the poorest 20% 
income share.  
 
With respect to health, again, the income variable alone was not found to be a very 
efficient indicator of living standard increases, decreasing child mortality between 2-6%. 
Also, the inclusion of other variable allowed amore holistic picture explaining child mortality. 
Once more the additional variables triggered a more elastic downwards response in child 
mortality, suggesting that GDP is a weak measure of living standards.  
 
Looking at educational standards, no clear interpretation was possible. While 
literacy rates and primary school completion seemed to increase significantly with growth, 
the relationship broke down when including income inequality.  
 
For the purpose of this dissertation, these results thus confirm the existence of the 
growth-living-standard–link which is reasonably strong  in terms of poverty reduction about 
1:1, less so in terms of health improvement and unclear in terms of educational standards. It 
also showed that the strength of this link depends on the nature of growth, which was 
simulated by including further control factors. In all models, this proved vital and challenged 
the conclusion that growth readily implies higher living standards. It appeared farfetched 
when inequality was prevalent and other variables proved similarly strong or more 
informative in reflecting changes in living standards, suggesting that GDP alone is not a 
sufficient proxy for the various factors that make up the dynamics of changes in living 
standards. This result thus backs the idea that an adjusted GDP would be able to give a 
better normative indicator as it allowed a more holistic picture. 
 
2.2. Common Problems of Alternatives 
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Having seen empirical evidence on the weak correlation between GDP and living 
standards, it is clear that socio-economic progress in terms of growth elasticities of living 
standards is captured weakly by GDP, so that there is now a legitimate question about the 
utility of alternative approaches. The rising interest in a new “true cost economics” that takes 
into account negative externalities of growth, has let people to propose a wide range of new 
factors to be included, starting from environment\tal costs and unused stocks, to household 
production, leisure time, voluntary work, happiness, costs of crime, family split-up, social 
cohesion, etc..  
 
While being undoubtedly interesting ideas, the indicators constructed on this basis 
share common problems. Critics have argued that measuring intangibles like well-being and 
other non-market values are too subjective and can therefore not be realised, which is partly 
true. Indeed, attaching monetary value to all direct and indirect burdens occurring along the 
process of production is a delicate issue, as there exists no ready-to-use formula for it and 
people have different preferences and the appreciation of recreational area for example 
varies greatly between people. lxiii Garlikov even sees a “moral book-keeping nightmare” at 
the end of the road, leading to a situation, where we have to pay when asking for the time or 
to get passed the salt. lxiv 
 
However, an adjusted GDP does not aim to take into account virtually everything 
that we currently do not measure. Rather, the argument is to adjust for the challenges we 
are facing, in terms of environmental externalities and some social factors such as inequality. 
Concerning the measurement problem then, substantial progress has been made in 
environmental economics and welfare economics in resource accounting, the development 
of social indicators and generally quantification of intangibles drawing on techniques such as 
hedonic pricing, contingent valuation, entropic measurement. So, the methods and 
techniques are around the corners which enable us to measure whatever progress we want 
to move towards whatever society we want to live in.  
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The problem remaining is that one would have to agree upon which factors to 
include and which weight to attach to them in an index number. As this ultimately depends 
on personal judgment, there are many ways to justify a particular weighted structure and as 
they depend on individual circumstances, surely all are legitimate for their purpose. The 
attempt to overcome the major sin of GDP not capturing non-market values therefore also 
implies sacrificing the major virtue of the GDP, in being the aggregate objective measure of 
subjective choices of “billions of consumers and producers who jointly determined world 
prices”.lxv However, this is an issue arising along the construction of any indicator including 
the GDP. The apparent objectivity of GDP is rather due to the unawareness about the 
implicit acceptance of underlying value judgments with which priorities about what should be 
considered “productive activity” were set in the first place. lxvi What an adjusted GDP would 
do is a mere shift the subjective priorities set during the development of the conventional 
GDP. Ones there is agreement on what type of growth should be standardised, this will 
allow to aggregate a new objective measure.  
 
In this same line of argument, critics have emphasised that “replacing GDP with 
more sophisticated yardsticks could prove to be the slippery slope to daddy-knows-best”, i.e. 
make it prone to political instrumentalisation. lxviiA commonly noted example for this is 
indeed the beginning of the Sen-Stiglitz initiative, instigated by Stiglitz. Regarding the 
Maastricht criteria that the public deficit should not exceed 3.6 percent of GDP, which 
France violated over several years, critics of an adjusted GDP heard found political 
reckoning in this seemingly well intentioned endeavour. Indeed, this critique is serious and 
precaution has to be taken that new measurements are not instrumentalised for vested 
interests, à la “If GDP will not grow as you wish, use an alternative that will.” lxviii Having been 
one of the people, who thought similarly about this surprisingly progressive idea proposed 
by a hyperactive and controversial figure such as Sarkozy, I must however acknowledge 
that once there is legislative agreement on measurement techniques used and the 
respective weights to attach, the issue of political instrumentalisation of an adjusted GDP 
should not be prevalent.    
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Another underlying issue often pointed out by critics is that cost internalisation on 
macro level will translate hidden costs on the microeconomic level. While there are intuitive 
ethical arguments suggesting that environmentally and socially harmful economic activity 
should not be added to the GDP in the conventional way, critics argue that this additional 
taxation will be reflected mainly in higher consumer prices. The price of a car for example, 
was estimated to increase by about $40,000, when taking into account noise pollution, as 
well as air and other types of pollution. lxix This issue is important, as it relates crucially to the 
feasibility of the whole endeavour to measure welfare beyond GDP. If prices should rise too 
much, this will be politically unpopular. At this point, it makes sense to look at environmental 
and social costs separately, as I would suggest, they differ in their macro-micro pass-
through.  
 
2.3. Environmental Adjustment  
As far as environmental costs are concerned, there are 2 issues at stake. How do 
current costs compare to future costs and how do individual costs compare to social costs? 
Now, taking the example of climate change, we acknowledge that the question is not 
anymore whether or not to stop it, but when?! As the consequences of climate change are 
very likely to increase in the time we just talk about it, the trade-off seems to be between 
costs of stopping it sooner or costs of stopping climate change later plus the costs of 
irreparable consequences. A rather bleak trade-off, choosing between paying now or paying 
more later.  
 
But there is a lot of evidence, suggesting that an inclusion of environmental 
externalities would not be prohibitively expensive. A good illustration of this is a Mc Kinsey 
study published in 2007, which analysed how much greenhouse gases, can be reduced at 
what cost in the US? lxx This case study seems vital, as it was presented 2 weeks after the 
IPPC published the Stern Report thereby benefiting from the attention the most 
comprehensive statement on climate change had received, while providing a concrete plan 
to tackle it. Further, it was produced by Mc Kinsey, i.e. very fact-based rational people, 
ready to sell themselves to the highest bidder. It was very pleasing to hear “Greenpeace” 
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conclusions from very profit-oriented people: “Using a Mix of wide range of proven of high 
tech abatement strategies, the US could reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 by 3-
4.5% gigatons of Carbon dioxide equivalent, which would involve marginal costs as little as 
50$ per ton abated”, while the CO2-emission savings would actually generate 40% net 
national savings, gained through higher energy efficiency, new technology” and a massive 
coordinated “action across all sectors”.lxxi  
Table 2: Major findings of McKinsey study (Creyts, Derkach, Nyquist, Ostrowski, 
Stephenson, 2007, p. 67) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Mc Kinsey study concluding that avoiding climate change has negative costs and 
that it is in fact entirely inefficient and economically irrational to ignore environmental 
externalities, gives good reason for thinking that while individual costs of internalising 
environmental costs may vary, the consequences of not doing so will be increasingly costly 
and born unequally by the whole society. Further, McKinsey proposed that most efficient 
abatement opportunities are “time perishable”, i.e. every year of delayed action, will 
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decrease the potential savings and increase the costs which may become irreparable in 
foreseeable time. When they conclude calling for a sudden global coordination, which 
McKinsey sees as a requisite of success, to me this sounds very much like what an adjusted 
GDP would do best. There is no more direct and decentralised way to send the right signals 
to individuals other than prices and there is no better coordinated economy- and sector-wide 
action than adjusting the GDP. Conventional GDP is a great point of departure, as it is 
widely acknowledged and has proven its effectiveness over the last 2 generations. An 
adjustment for factors agreed upon, would bring a sustainable correction of it, so as to 
subsequently benefit from its relatively automated mechanism, with which it aggregates the 
principle of individualism in the market system. If these incentives are set correctly and 
applied to the macro-micro and meso-level, then I think the relationship between sustainable 
development and economic growth would not seem to be a trade-off anymore, but be 
perfectly compatible with moral principles working in a market economy thereby offering a 
possible solution to the tragedy of Commons.  lxxii 
 
2.4. Social Adjustment 
We pass now to the more difficult case of social cost adjustment, which was the 
proposed response to the frequent observation and concern that the “real” amenities of life 
have declined even though economies have grown. While empirical research shows no 
clear evidence between growth and  inequality, crime rates and family split-up, these are 
frequently referred to be worsening in a growing economy. The social Kuznets suggests an 
explanation for the first phenomenon that income inequality increases in the earlier stages of 
growth and then decreases. As people get richer, it also seems comprehensible that more 
criminals are attracted. Further, a wealthier society is more independent and individualistic 
rather than family based, which would be a possible reasoning for explaining higher family 
split-up rates. However, empirical evidence is contradictory on these factors. In more recent 
empirical studies, income inequality for example is as often found to be positively related to 
growth, as negatively, that is it seems to be neutral to growth and cannot be sufficiently 
explained through changes in growth rates.  
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Nevertheless, it is clear that a broader definition of progress would include many of 
these non-income social dimensions, for which high standards would be set in a framework 
of genuine progress. This would include factors like social cohesion, leisure time and man’s 
ability to enjoy the amenities of life. Proponents of a social adjustment refer to Aristotle for 
example, who argued that leisure is a requisite for intellectual ability and should therefore be 
included as it contributes to the quality of life.lxxiiiAs they observe growth being associated 
with an general decline in these indicators of well-being, progress indicators were developed 
which include these factors, but also voluntary work, household work, parental time spent 
with children, family split-up…etc. The essence of this philosophy was realised in 1972 with 
the GNH (Gross National Happiness), which serves as the official GDP equivalent in Bhutan. 
Based on the concept of sustainable development and Buddhism, it includes mental 
wellness, workplace wellness, social wellness, political wellness as 4 of 7 components that 
make up the happiness indicator. lxxiv 
 
Now, whether or not social costs are caused by growth or not, accounting for them 
in the national account would be worth consideration as from a certain point onwards, social 
costs like very high crime rates or very high inequality, become constraints to growth, 
generally causing loss of social cohesion and economic insecurity and potentially also social 
unrest or terrorism. However, the question remains whether this would be useful? As far as 
an environmental adjustment concerned, an efficiency effect was observed. The money 
spent on technology change and coordination, was found to pay off in net savings. As much 
as I agree with the desirability of a social adjustment, particularly for inequality, it seems that 
for a social adjustment this efficiency effect could not be expected to pay off in monetary 
terms. While an inclusion of inequality, crime rates…and other broad social dimension would 
generally create an incentive for policy makers to maximise wellbeing, the argument in 
favour of it could not be made on the grounds of efficient resource allocation, would have to 
appeal on the grounds of spiritual development, which may be feasible for a Kingdom of 
672,425 Buddhists in Bhutan, but is too esoteric for the world. Rather, criticisms about the 
hidden costs that critics have raised as mentioned earlier are very likely to hold true in this 
case. A broad inclusion of these factors on macroeconomic level, would be likely to be 
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passed through to consumer prices and therefore be politically unpopular having almost 
communist traits. Further, I consider the criticism of political instrumentalisation mainly valid 
for the inclusion of social costs. Though progress has been made in the measurement of 
experienced utility and well-being in the fields of psychology and neuroscience, this is “with 
some accuracy” and “open to multiple interpretations”lxxv. While such survey and 
approximation might be working for Bhutan Buddhists, the absence of a mathematical 
definition would be very prone to political instrumentalisation if applied over regionally. While 
I would therefore support a more pronounced distinguishment between uneconomic activity 
like crime and military expenditure in the national accounts, I do not belong to the 
proponents of a broad social adjustment for the time being, which is a mere call for the 
continuation of the research agenda on the measurement of the intangible social dimension 
of human wellbeing, particularly concerning inequality.  
 
Concluding this section, it was shown that the desirability of an adjusted GDP can 
be verified empirically, where the growth-living standard-link was analysed, which underlies 
our paradigm of progress. A weak correlation of income to living standard was found, which 
when controlled for other variables appeared insufficient to allow legitimating this 
association as verified. Given the empirical evidence on the desirability of an adjusted GDP 
part of the proposed adjustment was found balanced by economic utility, clear-cut in terms 
of environmental costs and requiring further research in terms of social costs, which 
currently cannot be judged useful and would require an even more radical reconsideration of 
the underlying paradigm of progress than an environmental adjustment would. 
 
3. Feasibility 
Now having set the moral/philosophical background of the issue, which outlined, 
why an adjusted GDP should be desirable in terms of sustainability and genuine progress, 
which was argued, is partly economically useful, a case study shall now give vital insights 
into the feasibility of the idea. Drawing on the experience of a Green GDP in China, 
feasibility shall be evaluated in order to draw conclusions and lessons learnt from the 
Chinese experience on the general applicability.  
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3. 1. Case study: Green GDP in China 
While Bhutan could have been considered here, China was interesting for several 
reasons. With a GDP of $7.8 trillion (2008) China is not only the second largest economy in 
the world but with 6.2 gigatons of CO2 equivalent of emissions, it is also the largest polluter 
in the world.lxxvilxxvii Secondly, China has experienced both unprecedented growth and 
unparalleled and premature deaths due to environmental pollution. Further, there are few 
countries that are as fixated on growth as China. If one government would have to be 
identified that epitomises the modernist paradigm belief in growth as a state religion, China’s 
pseudo communist government would be a serious competitor. There are in deed very few 
countries where governments are almost solely promoted on the basis of the growth they 
produced. Finally, the Green GDP attempt in China is interesting because it failed. lxxviii 
While most developed countries went through a period of rapid growth in the course 
of their industrial revolution, where environmental pollution increased sharply and 
subsequently had to be cleaned up, China experiences both of this at an unprecedented 
scale. With double digit growth rates, China has thereby also gotten to a point where 
environmental pollution is the second most frequent cause of premature death. 16 of the 25 
most polluted cities are in China.lxxix Against this background of global importance, China 
commissioned Alexander Wang with a study on an environmentally corrected GDP to see 
the real cost of Chinese industrialisation. What was subsequently called the “Green GDP” 
corrected for pollution, environmental degradation and resource depletion thus being the 
first attempt to quantify the true progress empirically. The conclusions presented in the 
report for 2004 were staggering to some people. It found that economic loss due to 
environmental pollution was 511.8 billion Yuan that is 3.05% of GDP in 2004. lxxx Once 
published, the results became an anathema to provincial leaders, who substantially relied on 
heavy industry as major income source. As provinces saw their growth rate reduced 
dramatically, this clear signal that something is wrong with their success strategy, was 
received with great opposition to the initiative. With an increasing number of opponents in 
the local government system, the project was then withdrawn the official status, so as to 
continue it debased to just another academic side-project. Official reason for the 
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cancellation were “immature” measurement techniques, while it was more than obvious 
what tremendous effort the industrial lobby would have had to mobilise, had the initiative 
been carried out further. As an alternative to the Green GDP, the Chinese government then 
included environmental factors into the categories for promotion of provincial leaders. 
However, still if you can increase GDP in your province, “you’re the man”, that is decisions 
are mainly based on performance in terms of wealth and employment creation with an 
additional environmental component as a matter of beauty. So clearly, incentives favour 
growth over environmental protection. lxxxi Interestingly, the second report due to be 
published in 2007, was announced to be "delayed indefinitely" by the responsible agencies. 
lxxxii 
 
3. 2. Conditions required for policy effectiveness of an adjusted GDP   
Though the initiative failed, the lessons learnt from this case study are very relevant 
for projecting them onto answering the general question, under which conditions an 
environmentally adjusted GDP would be able to have a real policy effect in the direction of 
sustainability?  
 
1. Given the underlying incentive structures, the project was doomed to failure 
In a country, where the economic system has been “geared” over the last decades 
to grow its way out of poverty, it is in fact even surprising that the first report got published at 
all. lxxxiii While the Chinese government seemed to have the aim to genuinely tackle the 
pollution problem, opposition was provoked as the provincial leaders, reliant on heavy 
industries, rather hysterically observed GDP decreasing. As the same incentive structures 
are operating everywhere, this implies that industries will react with disguise, as long as 
lower growth rates imply lower success rates and fewer promotion opportunities, which may 
be not necessarily the case.  
 
2. Project promotion in the industry to transmit awareness for economic benefits  
After the political failure of the Green GDP, the Chinese government pursued an 
alternative strategy to tackle the issue, by establishing ambitious targets to reduce pollution 
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and increase energy efficiency. Being very strict with these targets, the industry was unable 
to meet them, so the strategy was doomed to fail as well. As outlined earlier however, the 
case for an environmental adjustment can be made on rational grounds. If awareness for 
the gains from energy efficiency would have been created beforehand, the project could 
have been received differently.  
 
3. Paradigm shift  
Given that cost internalisation of undesirable outcomes would raise prices possibly 
substantially for some products in the polluting industries, a change of mind set would be 
needed showing that current prices may be kept artificially low, while the true price is paid 
by the entire society. Prices are thus not rising, but simply returning to their true cost level. 
Keeping them artificially low creates incentives to keep producing at this level, thereby only 
increasing the cost that is both born society (Tragedy of Commons). Stopping to treat ”the 
scarce as if it were non scarce, and the non scarce as if it were scarce” is the paradigm shift 
that is required and depending on how broad the qualitative definition of the desired 
progress will be, societies will have to ask themselves how much they are willing to pay for 
an inclusion of social well-being factors on a global scale.lxxxiv 
 
4. Green GDP failure shows its effectiveness  
Intriguingly, the reasons for which Green GDP failed in China, are precisely the 
reasons for which it would be effective on a global scale. The strong resistance in the 
industry proved that the problem was taken by its root and sent a genuine signal to 
reconsider priorities, also did the withholding of the second report for 2005 show that the 
industry was seriously scared of the true cost reality. Further, the failure of the alternative 
target-strategy proves that the problem is unlikely to be tackled only by legislation, Kyoto, 
MDGs and the like. Effectively, these targets were nothing but internalising the true costs by 
another policy mean, that is law. The efforts spend on monitoring whether people really 
comply or just figure out how to meet the targets somehow without changing their actual 
behaviour, stands however in no comparison with the decentralised effect that an 
adjustment in the accounting system would send through on all levels. 
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5. Macro-Meso-Micro approach 
As an official initiative, the Green GDP was initiated following a top-down approach 
and failed at the micro level, where its price was seemed prohibitive. This illustrates that an 
environmentally or socially sensitive political economic model must be pursued on all levels, 
working at micro-macro and meso level where the pass though of the accounting change 
has to be analysed carefully in terms of whether accounting changes is able to change 
behaviour. Potential explicit policy measures could include a reformation of national 
accounts into cost and benefit accounts on macro level, an ecological tax reform on meso 
level and limit on income inequality on micro level. lxxxv 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation evaluated the idea of an environmentally and socially adjusted 
GDP in terms of its desirability, utility and feasibility. Approaching the question from a moral 
philosophical point of view, it was outlined how an understanding of progress and our 
current paradigm in progress emerged over time and on which mechanical mind set it is 
based. It followed an approach from a utility point of view, which took a more analytical and 
empirical stance to the question and was concerned with testing the strength of the alleged 
link between GDP and living standards and the consistency of alternative measures.  The 
section showed that utility depends on the agreement on a common measurement, which is 
necessary in terms of credibility and the effect on prices, which is also crucial to make the 
project politically feasible. An optimistic conclusion could be drawn for an environmental 
adjustment, which based on evidence from a McKinsey study could be presented to be 
nothing but economically perfectly rational in terms of pure cost and resource allocation 
reasons. Further it was found that a social adjustment requires further research, as it is 
problematic in terms of measurement problems, which still leave results open to varied 
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interpretations, thereby making it still prone to political instrumentalisation. As a last part, the 
question was approached using a case study in China, where a Green GDP attempt failed in 
2007.   Lessons learnt from this were projected to point out the necessary conditions 
required for policy effectiveness of an adjusted GDP.  
 
Having lived for 200 years in a growing economy, we may now have to admit, that 
mankind has come to live in a paradigm of progress beyond the physical limits. In our 
unfettered believe in an ever-progressing growing economy, we may have realised too little 
that growth no longer makes us happier, when social cohesion evades at the same time as 
we announce proudly announce a booming economy. Abstracting from the amount of 
money that we spend on cleaning up environmental pollution may have long been 
acceptable for the sake of just having more growth. But more growth of what? Progress 
where to and for what price? What are we chasing there?  Maybe the time has come to 
remind ourselves of what classical political economists like John Stuart Mill have said about 
a steady state economy – a situation where we only grow at a replacement rate closely in 
concurrence with the physical boundaries. Four our generation, the issue of sustainability is 
no longer about just using different light bulbs and buying in charity shops, we may well be 
the last generation to prevent climate change becoming irrevocable. An adjustment of the 
GDP would be a powerful tool to achieve this, as it approaches the problems more direct 
and on all levels in a unique and comprehensive way. In the wake of a triple crisis 
experienced lately, 2009 may provide an enabling environment for change. The Sen-Stiglitz 
initiative is therefore of crucial importance, enabling us to redefine progress that we want 
with a measure that is responsive to the things that we really value. Otherwise, and the story 
has been told many times, it remains to be repeated that if we keep on living beyond those 
natural limits that we depend on and ignoring the true social costs of our lifestyle, we will 
realise painfully that inequality has economic costs and that nature does not need us.  
 
Word count: 13499 
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